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János Kornai: From Socialism 
to Capitalism 
Budapest 2008: Central European 
University Press, 240 pp.
János Kornai’s latest volume contains seven 
papers written over the past 20 years. The 
earliest one was a lecture originally pre-
sented in March 1989 in Moscow (Chap-
ter 2), the latest ones were written or pub-
lished in 2005; one of them (Chapter 6) ap-
pears in English for the ﬁ rst time in this 
volume. The book begins with papers sum-
marising Kornai’s work on the political 
economy of state socialism, the rest belongs 
to the sub-ﬁ eld known as ‘transitology’ in 
the social sciences.
With Oscar Lange, Kornai ranks as the 
most distinguished and inﬂ uential politi-
cal economist of state socialism (or what-
ever name you want to use for the socio-
economic systems that existed after 1917 
across the globe from Russia to China, and 
which still struggle for survival in two 
countries of the world: North Korea and 
Cuba).
The most admirable feature of Kor-
nai’s work on socialism and post-commu-
nism is his consistence. From his wonder-
ful book on ‘overcentralisation’ (which was 
his PhD dissertation and appeared in Eng-
lish already in 1959), through his Rush ver-
sus Harmonic Growth [1972], Economics of 
Shortage ([1980] – the work that I still regard 
as his most important contribution to insti-
tutionalist economics and for which he was 
nominated repeatedly for the Nobel Prize, 
a recognition he would have well deserved), 
to The Socialist System [1992], he built the 
most comprehensive and convincing anal-
ysis of the socialist economic system. His 
oeuvre is astonishingly coherent. The most 
remarkable aspect of Kornai‘s work is not 
so much that he knew it all along, but rath-
er his ongoing and uncompromising strug-
gle to understand the nature of socialism. 
He was always ready to learn and re-adjust 
his explanations as the world of commu-
nism changed. Kornai is one of those rare 
social scientists who do not pretend he was 
always right, but all his life made a strenu-
ous effort to ﬁ nd the theory that offers the 
best ﬁ t to the rapidly changing world 
around him even if it meant to re-think, if 
necessary, to change his earlier views. 
Kornai started his career as a journalist 
with virtually no training in economics, 
writing on economic matters during the 
worst Stalinist times for the central daily 
newspaper of the Hungarian Communist 
Party, Szabad Nép. As he gradually under-
stood the inefﬁ ciencies of what, in Chap-
ter 1 of the present volume, he calls the 
‘classical system’, he became one of the 
leading journalists expressing their dissent 
against Stalinism. Kornai abandoned jour-
nalism, taught himself economics (even 
some econometrics), and moved on to de-
velop his formidable, ever deepening cri-
tique of socialism. From a devoted commu-
nist he became eventually a forceful (though 
always sober, never dogmatic) advocate of 
free market economy and pluralist democ-
racy. 
His point of departure was the recog-
nition that the classical system is unworka-
ble since it is overcentralised. Publishing a 
book along those lines in 1957 was a coura-
geous act. Though Kornai’s primary aim in 
his ﬁ rst book and in most of the following 
ones was primarily not to offer recommen-
dations for reforms, but to explain the rea-
sons for the malfunctioning of the socialist 
economy, the book at least in Hungary (but 
arguably indirectly in some other socialist 
countries, like Yugoslavia, pre-1968 Czech-
oslovakia, and Poland) affected economic 
policies and serious attempts were made to 
create more decentralised forms of man-
agement.
Kornai soon learned that even radical 
decentralisation would not be sufﬁ cient 
to correct the inherent problems of com-
munist economies. Since these systems 
were implemented in economically back-
ward countries, socialism became a strate-
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gy of accelerated or ‘rush’ growth, espe-
cially what was known in Marxist politi-
cal economy as accelerated development of 
Department I. Well, harmonious growth, 
a shift from the obsession with the devel-
opment of heavy industry and mining to 
the production of consumer goods, infra-
structure, to the tertiary sector, is what may 
be needed. It was the year of the publica-
tion of Rush versus Harmonic Growth that 
Kornai invited me and my friend and co-
author George Konrád to visit him. In 1971 
we had just published an article titled ‘So-
cial Conﬂ ict of Under-urbanization’, and it 
created a major scandal in Hungary, though 
I still regard it as one of the better pieces I 
ever wrote. Like in Kornai’s book, we ar-
gued that the single most important charac-
teristic of socialism is overinvestment in the 
productive sector and neglect of consump-
tion, especially infrastructure. This was the 
ﬁ rst time we met in person: he was kind 
and generous, but even then, almost 1972, 
he was highly critical of our attempt in this 
paper to cast our analysis as a problem of 
social conﬂ ict, in fact, as a problem of class 
conﬂ ict and exploitation. This paper was 
my ﬁ rst ﬂ irtation with Marxism and al-
ready in 1972 Kornai was well beyond 
Marxism and strongly disapproved of it.
In 1972 Konrád and I had just begun 
our work to identify socialism as a ‘redis-
tributive economy’ and within a year or 
two our neo-Polanyian theory was com-
pleted. Kornai did not like our term ‘redis-
tributive economy’, as it reminded him too 
much of the welfare redistribution of the 
social democratic welfare state. So he pro-
posed the idea of bureaucratic coordina-
tion. Chapter 1 of the current volume sum-
marises his major new arguments. In his 
view there are two fundamental forms of 
economic coordination: market and bu-
reaucracy. But it would be wrong to merely 
see bureaucratic coordination as ‘central 
planning’ or a ‘command economy’; it is 
rather a system in which central authori-
ties are linked to enterprise management 
by paternalistic ties (and management sim-
ilarly adopts a paternalistic attitude to-
wards workers). Under these circum stances 
the central authority is unable to issue 
mandatory comments. Instead it engages 
in a plan-bargain with management, which 
creates soft budget constraints for ﬁ rms. In 
market economies ﬁ rms have hard budget 
constraints: if they do not produce proﬁ t 
they go under. In socialist systems budget 
constraints are soft: inefﬁ cient ﬁ rms are 
bailed out by governments. Since ﬁ rms can 
always anticipate bailouts they will con-
stantly make excessive demands, which in-
evitably lead to chronic shortages. Bureau-
cratically coordinated economies are econ-
omies of shortages. Bingo! That was it: Ko-
rnai just produced the most powerful de-
scription of the way the socialist economy 
worked and he accomplished this in a val-
ue neutral manner – this book is on par 
with the best of institutionalist economics, 
a book indeed worthy of the Nobel Prize. 
Chapter 2 of this volume is a coura-
geous lecture Kornai gave at a conference 
in Moscow in March 1989, well before the 
USSR and its Communist Party (and the 
KGB) crumbled. It takes one important step 
further: if one opts for markets, eventually 
one will have to accept the domination 
of private ownership. In his path-breaking 
1984 article on ‘Bureaucratic and Market 
Coordination’ Kornai already established 
that there is an ‘elective afﬁ nity’ between 
bureaucratic coordination and public own-
ership and market coordination and pri-
vate ownership, but he did not get as far as 
to suggest that consequently market re-
forms will lead to capitalism. Now, Chap-
ter 2 foreshadows what is to come in The 
Socialist System. He is still careful though: 
Figure 2.1 is still about elective afﬁ nity and 
does not exclude the possibility of mixed 
economies. But he is more forceful in Chap-
ter 3, ﬁ rst published in 2008, where he not 
only calls market socialism an illusion, but 
also arrives at the conclusion that China 
and Vietnam, given their radical market re-
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forms, are for all practical purposes capi-
talist economies. No more nonsense about 
‘third ways’ or mixed economies, combina-
tions of socialism and capitalism, markets 
with public ownership or control, or mar-
ket integration with state redistribution or 
a mix of those arrangements. 
This leads him to argue in Chapter 7 
(as far as I can tell he developed this idea 
already in 1992) that socialism created a 
‘prematurely born welfare state’, which is 
to be reformed by allowing ‘individual 
freedom of choice’ (p. 176) and leaving it to 
a ‘sense of solidarity with those in a disad-
vantaged position and not capable of pay-
ing out of their pocket the costs they will 
incur if they are in trouble’. I can hardly 
read this as something other than a UK-US 
style means-tested temporary ‘poor relief’ 
for people in trouble and otherwise mar-
ket-arranged insurance schemes [Esping-
Andersen 1990], with at the same time cut-
backs on the excessive expenditures of the 
‘prematurely born welfare state’.
This is an admirably consistent argu-
ment and I am the last one who would or 
can blame Kornai for re-adjusting his anal-
ysis to the changing realities of the world. 
I like his lack of orthodoxy, his soberness, 
his realism. With all due respect to his 
splendid scholarship and acute sense of po-
litical realism I do have to express my disa-
greement though with some of his analysis, 
especially with some of the conclusions he 
arrived at in The Socialist System and many 
of the chapters of his current volume.
First of all, I did and still do have my 
debate with Kornai about the accuracy of 
‘bureaucratic coordination’. This is far from 
just a terminological controversy. I believe 
Kornai does not quite appreciate the Po-
lanyian meaning of redistribution and like 
earlier critics of my work he did not see the 
fundamental difference between a redis-
tributively integrated economy (where the 
‘surplus’ – the resources which can be used 
for investments or turned into proﬁ t – is 
concentrated in central hands before being 
redistributed) and the welfare redistribu-
tion of capitalist states, which redistributes 
incomes earned in and determined by mar-
kets in the name of social justice and/or 
solidarity. Bureaucratic coordination does 
not really capture what the socialist state 
does, it describes how they do it (though 
doing coordination bureaucratically is hard-
ly a characteristic of capitalist states). If we 
believe Weber, bureaucracy is the purest 
form of ‘legal-rational domination’. It is 
present not only in the capitalist state appa-
ratus but also in the large privately owned 
corporation that Oliver Williamson called 
‘hierarchy’ – but it tells us little about what 
states do. So the crucial question is wheth-
er incomes of ﬁ rms or individuals are de-
termined on price regulating markets, and 
whether those ﬁ rms and individuals can 
dispose with such income (proﬁ ts), with 
some limitations imposed on them by usu-
ally impersonally deﬁ ned and universally 
applied taxes. 
If we understand socialism in this 
sense as a redistributive economy we can 
see with clarity that socialism was not only 
a prematurely born welfare state. In fact, it had 
no welfare state at all. In the East European 
parlance, economists and politicians quite 
rightly write about the ‘great distributive 
systems’ rather than ‘welfare systems’. 
It is indeed a common misunderstand-
ing to see the socialist great distributive 
systems (pensions, health care, funding of 
education) as identical with what used to 
be the Scandinavian social democratic uni-
versal welfare insurance system [Esping-
Andersen 1990]. That system provided as 
citizenship the right to free universally high 
quality services. So middle or even higher 
incomes did not see a need to seek market-
based provisions (which otherwise were 
available to them) and were willing to pay 
high taxes to receive publicly provided 
health care, pensions, and education (even 
tertiary education). I am not arguing here 
that this was a perfect system, but it had 
precious little to do how the ‘great distrib-
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utive systems’ worked under state social-
ism, especially what Kornai referred to un-
der the ‘classical system’. 
There are three great mythologies 
about the great distributive systems under 
socialism, namely that they a) were univer-
sal, b) offered equal services, and c) were 
free. These are the characteristics of social 
democratic universal welfare insurance 
schemes as described by Esping-Andersen 
[1990]. The socialist great distributive sys-
tems were hardly universal. They typically 
were only available to those in state em-
ployment. Even those in the cooperative or 
kolkhoz sector had hardly any access, not 
to mention the ‘criminal’, ‘hooligan’ ele-
ments either incapable or unwilling to be 
gainfully employed. So access to the great 
distributive systems was a reward for work, 
not a right earned by citizenship. The serv-
ices were hardly egalitarian. The higher 
cadres lived in better housing. They had 
access to better medical services, shopped 
in special shops for scarce goods with 
even more subsidised prices, and their chil-
dren had higher chances of getting into 
insti tutions of tertiary education and even 
into higher quality primary or secondary 
schools, etc. And of course all those servic-
es were free only for the higher-ups. Poor 
people could not get public housing, had 
to build for themselves on the market [Sze-
lényi 1983], ordinary people had to ‘tip’ 
doctors to get a bed in a hospital or have an 
operation in a timely manner, though the 
cadres went to special clinics and hospitals 
where tipping was illegal, where the best 
qualiﬁ ed doctors worked, and where pa-
tients had their private rooms. So the serv-
ices were free for those who could afford to 
pay for them but were quite expensive for 
those in the lower income brackets. It is al-
so true that income inequalities were low 
and the great distributive system in a way 
‘corrected’ for artiﬁ cially low income ine-
qualities. The great distributive systems 
operated as fringe beneﬁ ts, which beneﬁ t-
ed those whose contribution to society was 
appreciated more by the authorities, who 
set wages and determined access to servic-
es provided by the great distributive sys-
tems. This was not a welfare system as we 
normally understand it. It was a workfare 
system, a system of fringe beneﬁ ts. To put 
it very simply: while in capitalist welfare 
systems income inequalities are higher be-
fore redistribution and somewhat lower af-
ter redistribution, in socialist redistributive 
systems income inequality appears to be 
low, but actual social inequalities are high-
er if we take into account what people re-
ceive from the great distributive system. 
As I put it in my 1978 article: while in mar-
ket economies the market creates inequali-
ties and redistribution moderates those in-
equalities, in redistributive economies re-
distribution creates inequalities and mar-
kets moderate them.
Kornai’s theory of the ‘prematurely 
born welfare state’ had negative policy im-
plications. From the theory it follows that 
the overgrown welfare state should be cut 
back – and that is what post-communist so-
cieties did, which resulted in a deepening 
of the split between the poor and the rich. 
Yet the task, following my theory, should 
have been to create a capitalist welfare state 
from the socialist workfare state. It is not 
simply true that the former socialist socie-
ties spend too much on welfare. Both the 
Czech Republic and Hungary spend, for 
instance, less per capita than Spain or 
Greece. What is true is that they do not 
spend it wisely, since the logic of the social-
ist workfare state still survived: even those 
who could afford to purchase such services 
on the market or private insurance are 
funded from taxpayers’ money. Reform of 
the great distributive system is indeed 
needed, however the main aim is not to cut 
back expenditure on health care and edu-
cation, but to redistribute it from the rich to 
the poor, rather than the other way around.
Let me make a ﬁ nal point about mixed 
economies and the elective afﬁ nity be-
tween forms of economic integration and 
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property rights. It is far from obvious that 
the purer the economic systems are, the 
better they work. It is far from obvious 
that clearly deﬁ ned private property rights 
work best with unregulated free markets. 
The capitalist world economy experienced 
its fastest growth with the lowest income 
inequalities when, at least in continental 
Europe, substantial sectors of the economy 
(even some sectors of industry) were pub-
licly owned and managed and when gov-
ernment implemented quite extensive in-
terventions into the workings of capital 
markets. The performance of core capitalist 
economies after substantial privatisation 
and deregulation of markets was under-
whelming and nowhere near the growth 
rates of the 1950s and 1960s while the in-
comes (and wealth) of the top deciles ex-
ploded in comparison with the incomes 
at the bottom of the society. As I am writ-
ing this review, in March 2009, govern-
ments around the world have already spent 
11 trillion USD of taxpayer money (about 
1500 USD for every individual on this 
globe, including those living in poor Afri-
can or Asian countries) to bail out the pri-
vate sector. It looks like private ﬁ rms in the 
absence of strict government regulations 
can also have ‘soft budget’ constraints. It is 
not inconceivable that a large proportion 
of the banking sector has to be nationalised 
to rescue the world from a crisis, which 
could be worse without massive state in-
tervention than the 1929–1933 Great De-
pression was. At least at the moment when 
I am writing this review it looks like a mix 
of public and private ownership, planning 
and markets are not only possible, but may 
be necessary for the survival of capitalism. 
Capitalism and free markets have to be de-
fended by smart states from capitalism, 
from laissez faire. This reads like some sort 
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